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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of the district courts decisions to revoke and reinstate the
defendant's probation which occurred on March 27, 2006. R. 162. For appellate review
is the district court's February 21, 2006 and January 9, 2006 incorrect determinations that
Defendant had violated the terms of her probation by allegedly underpaying her
restitution. After erroneously finding on January 9, 2006 that Defendant underpaid her
restitution, on February 21, 2006, the court revoked Ms. Gambill's probation and
reinstated her 36 month's probation. Ruling on Order to Show Cause - R. 137; Minutes
of Review Hearing - R. 162. (Addenda A and B). The defendant also challenges the
district court's original jurisdiction for the first time of appeal. The exception of plain
error is basis for this challenge. The felony charges originally filed were commenced by
information on January 2, 2002. R. 4. The plain language of the information
demonstrates that the charge was filed more than 4 years after the alleged offense was
said to occur, "on or about May, 1997." Id. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1) (a) (Supp.
2003) limits prosecutions for felonies excepted otherwise to four years stating "a felony
or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed." Id.
This Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3 (1953, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1 (b) (1953, as amended), and
Utah R. App. P. 14. The defendant timely filed two notices of appeal; her notice of
appeal was filed on February 7, 2006 and amended on April 6, 2006 following the entry
of the court's final order revoking and reinstating her probation. The order was entered

on March 27, 2006. R. 162.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the district court violated Section 77-18-1 when to

extended probation relying solely on prior sentencing judge's in-court stated
recommendation and intent that restitution be paid "within one year."?
Preservation of Issue: The Sentence Judgment and Commitment of
September 30, 2002, entered into the record on October 3, 2002 was not violated. R. 43.
(Addendum D).1 The issue was addressed by Defendant at her hearings of:
June 6, 2005 (T. 10) (seeking release from probation);
July 5, 2005 (T. 15, 17) (asking the court to terminate probation as requested by
AP&P);
August 9, 2005 (T. 24, 26) (State conceding documents did not coincide with
Court's intentions), (T. 25-26) (State moves to dismiss or strike the order to show cause
because State lacked confidence to prove that Defendant violated her probation); (T. 28)
(State concedes that Plea Agreement only required payment of $50,000 restitution,
balance to convert to civil judgment); (T. 32) (order states restitution to be paid at a rate
determined by AP&P); (T. 34) (Defendant faithfully paid her restitution as agreed); (T.
36) (because of States's dismissal of order to show cause, requested that matter be reset

1

The original September 30,2002 sentence at R. 43 should not be confused with the
false September 30, 2002 entry at R.123.

2

later for a review hearing);
September 13, 2005 (T. 39) (State concedes that AP&P did not follow the Court's
in-court stated intentions to have restitution paid within one year);2
September 20, 2005 (T. 44, 48) (Defendant and State concur that prior OSC had
been dismissed by State); (T. 46, 47, 49) (no violation of probation, therefore OSC was
reset for Review only and Court denies ordering AP&P to file amended affidavit for
OSC); (T. 50, 53) (State and Court agree to proceed on violation of probation upon tape
of hearing, and court takes judicial notice - see footnote 1, supra.); (T. 56) (Defendant
moves for extension of probation to prepare for evidentiary hearing of alleged probation
violation);
November 22, 2005 (T. 59) (evidentiary hearing before different judge); (T. 6769) (probation officer states the terms he followed stating only "$300,000 with interest"
"at a rate determined by AP&P) and that he arranged payments of $500 a month); (T. 73)
(Defendant "[paid] $500 per month consistently"); (T. 74) (probation officer testified
erroneously that payment of $300,000 was to be paid in full by end of 36 months);3

2

The written order failed to state while on probation the restitution was to be paid
within one year. That portion of the sentence was suspended along with the suspension of
her prison incarceration. R. 43.
3

This testimony is contrary to the statements contained in AP&P's report requesting
early termination of probation. R. 64-65; cf. R. 82-83 (AP&P's second progress/violation
report filed alleging a violation contrary to previous request for early termination - this was
ordered by the judge based upon his September 30, 2002 intentions.
3

Standard of Review: The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed
de novo for correctness. State v. Gallic 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). When reviewing
legal conclusions for correctness, the Courts grants "no deference to the district [court's]
legal determinations." Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998).
The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial
court. Therefore, in order to succeed in this claim, defendant must show that the evidence
of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so
deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation. State
v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990).

2.

Issue: Whether the district court violated Gambill's rights to due process

allowing a criminal matter to proceed when it was clear that the felony statute of
limitations period in 76-1-302 had run?
Preservation of Issue: Plain Error exception to issue raised first time on
appeal. In the district court's record, the criminal information states the date of offense
was "on or about May, 1997" and the date the information was filed was "January 2,
2002." R. 1. The conviction of defendant, an Arizona citizen of Unregistered Securities
Agent, a third decree felony and of Sale of Unregistered Security, a third degree felony
was clear error, R. 38, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 ((1953, as amended).

4

Standard of Review: Because the issue is being raised for the first time
on appeal, the Court must review the issue under a plain error standard. See State v.
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To establish plain error, a defendant
must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. See State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah
1993). In this case, Defendant raises the issue of statute of limitations. The
determination of which limitations period applies to a third degree felony is a statutory
interpretation, and a court's interpretation of a statute is a legal conclusion. State v.
McGee, 31 P. 3d 531 (Utah 2001); State v. Burns. 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000); see also Quick
Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C.. 12 P.3d 577 (Utah 2000). Furthermore, whether the
statute of limitations has run is a legal conclusion. See Estes v. Tibbs. 979 P.2d 823
(Utah 1999) ("The trial court's application of a statute of limitations presents a question
of law [that] we review for correctness." (citing Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah
1998))).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES.*
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (Supp. 2003)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (Supp. 2003)

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2003)
(* See these provisions in Addendum C).

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This matter is the appeal of the district courts determination of a violation of

Defendant's terms of probation. R. 41, 43, 166. After finding a perceived violation of
probation for underpaying her restitution, the district court revoked and reinstated the
defendant Jackie Gambill's probation for another 36 months. R. 137. This determination
is illogical because Gambill's restitution payments were agreed to by AP&P as instructed
in the Court's October 3, 2002 sentence judgment and commitment. R. 41, 43, 64, 14546, 152; T. 73.4 Originally, this proceeding commenced at the request of AP&P seeking
Gambill's early termination from probation in April 2005. R. 64, 153.

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
At issue of the court was whether the Defendant failed to pay her ordered

restitution of $300,000 within the terms required. The issue was at the hearing on
September 30, 2002 when the Defendant was sentenced, the in-court stated sentence was
that Defendant was prison and restitution to be paid within one year. The court then
stayed the commitment and ordered probation of 36 months. Judge Dawson restated that

4

At the evidentiary hearing in November 2005, the State's three exhibits are R. 145147, consisting of the Amended Affidavit for Order to Show Cause, AP&P's payment
instructions, and Gambill's 11/20/2002 Probation Agreement. Defendant's three Exhibits
are R. 147-157, consisting of the probation officer's affidavit, the 4/25/2005 progress report
(R. 64), and another progress report recommending early termination.
6

the $300,000 restitution was to be paid as AP&P determined, and added he intended it to
be paid within one year. In the entitle record, that is the only time Defendant was placed
on notice her restitution would need to be paid within one year.
Every entry of the record thereafter fails to address a time limit for Defendant to
pay her restitution. Actually, the court's written, Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
concerning the September 30, 2002 sentence is silent as to a time limit. That written
sentence simply reads "to be paid at a rate determined by AP&P." The record shows that
the State, AP&P, and Defendant all understood no limitation existed. At no time had
anyone sought to correct the judgment either. Instead, on April, the State, through AP&P
filed a progress report requesting the early termination of the Defendant's probation.
Agent Haurand wrote, "Adult Probation and Parole recommends termination of formal
supervised probation and requests remaining restitution be converted to civil judgment,
or, that the subject remain on probation to the court and payment be made through the
court."
Relying on the request, Judge Dawson sent a review hearing on June 6, 2005. At
that time, the court suggested that matter be converted to a civil judgment and the
restitution thereafter to left to the victims to collect. T. 10. After addressing the matter
further and then with a sidebar, the court decided he would review the sentencing tape
and rescheduled the matter for a following hearing. T. 13-14. The matter was
rescheduled for July 5, 2005. T. 14.

7

At the hearing held on July 5, 2005, T. 15, 17, Gambill asked the court to terminate
probation as requested by AP&P. T. 15. The judge resisted AP&P^s request for early
termination of probation arguing that he "ordered her to pay restitution of $300,000 to []
Edison Harris . . . $300,000 and I ordered that it be done in one year." T. 16. He
clarified, "My problem is, I perceive she's in violation of the terms of probation. Do you
see what I'm saying? T. 17. This perception was based upon his intentions that it be paid
within one year. T. 18. Having predisposed the idea of a violation, the judge then
directed AP&P to file an amended affidavit.5 T. 19.
Following this conversation, the matter reconvened on August 9, 2005. At that
time, the State conceded with Gambill that the documents pertaining to Mrs. Gambill did
not coincide with Court's intentions stated in the court's tape of the September 30, 2002
sentencing hearing where the court uttered his intentions. T. 24, 26 (T. 8). Because of
the deficiency, the State moved to dismiss or strike the order to show cause because the
State admittedly lacked confidence whether it could prove the defendant violated her
probation. T. 25-26. The State conceded that the parties' plea agreement only required
the payment of $50,000 restitution during probation and that the balance would convert to
a civil judgment. T. 28. The prosecutor, Michael Direda admitted that defendant was

5

That amended affidavit is in the Record. R. 84, filed on July 20, 2005. However,
a later amended affidavit was filed on September 20,2005. R. 119. That affidavit was later
appears in the record, R. 147, submitted by Defendant at the November 22,2005 evidentiary
hearing, marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1.
8

ordered restitution to be paid at a rate determined by AP&P. T. 32. The defendant
argued that Mrs. Gambill faithfully paid her restitution as agreed between her and AP&P.
T. 34. Direda also claimed that because of the State's dismissal of order to show cause,
requested that matter be reset later for a review hearing alone. R. 113; T. 36.
During the September 13, 2005 review hearing, the State conceded that AP&P did
not follow the Court's intentions to have restitution paid within one year. T. 39.6
Because of that discrepancy, the State confessed that in their office, the staff disputed as
to "whether or not it can be extended without a violation being found but in the
alternative . . . it is a violation because it was ordered by the Court that the $300,000 be
paid within one year. . . ." T. 40. The judge offered to adjourn while the court and parties
listened to the sentencing hearing tape. T. 40-41. Agreeing, the court went off the
record, and in chambers watched the sentencing. T. 41. Afterwards, defendant asked to
reschedule for the following week. T. 41-42. It was granted.
During the September 20, 2005 hearing, just ten days before probation would
expire, the defendant and State concurred that the prior OSC had been dismissed by the
State, by Michael Direda. T. 44, 48. In that hearing, defendant urged the court to
understand that no violation of probation resulted because she complied with the payment

6

The written order failed to state while on probation the restitution was to be paid
within one year. That portion of the sentence was suspended along with the suspension of
her prison incarceration. R. 43.
9

terms set by AP&P.7 T. 46, 47, 49. However, the court claimed to perceive otherwise,
therefore he requested the OSC be reset for Review only. T. 46, 47, 49. During that
hearing, the Court denied ordering AP&P to file an amended affidavit for OSC. Id. The
State and the court agreed to proceed on violation of probation relying solely on the tape
of the September 30, 2002 hearing, and the court took judicial notice - see footnote 1,
supra. T. 50, 53. Defendant moved for an extension of her probation to prepare for
evidentiary hearing of alleged probation violation. T. 56.
During the November 22, 2005 evidentiary hearing, the matter was held before a
different judge, Rodney S. Page, after a different Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
was placed in the record apparently for him to follow. T. 59; R. 123.8 Agent Haradfadf,
for AP&P, testified. He attested as to the terms he understood stating only "$300,000
with interest" "at a rate determined by AP&P" and that he arranged payments of $500 a
month. T. 67-69. No mention was made about the court's one year intention. He
admitted Defendant "[paid] $500 per month consistently." T. 73. Her AP&P agent
testified erroneously that payment of $300,000 was to be paid in full by end of 36

7

Note: Her actions were compliance with the original September 30,2002 sentence,
judgment and commitment entered on October 3, 2002. R. 43. The Appellant urges this
court to resist the false September 30, 2002 sentence, judgment and commitment in the
record filed on or about 10/21/2005 (the day of Judge Dawson's recusal). R. 127, 123.
8

Note: The sentence, judgment and commitment filed here precedes Judge Dawson's
voluntary recusal. The entry appear suspicious because the original sentence, judgment and
committed by Judge Dawson signed on October 3,2002 is entirely different. See. R. 43. R.
123 is a false entry.
10

months.9 T. 74. The written order, which must be followed, proscribes "Restitution is to
be paid at a rate AP&P determines." R. 43. The probation agreement states, "12.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: . . . 5. Pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.00 plus
interest to Edison Harris through AP&P at a rate determined by AP&P." R. 146. When
AP&P requested termination of probation, her AP&P Agent reported:
Ms. Gambill has paid $500 per month restitution since being placed on probation .
. . . The subject states she is paying $100.00 per month supervision fee to the State
of Arizona, which could also be added to the restitution payment if formal
supervision were terminated. Her Arizona probation officer states she is compliant
in all respects of supervision.
Maximum benefit of being on formal probation has been achieved. Adult
Probation and Parole recommends termination of formal supervised probation and
requests remaining restitution be converted to civil judgment, or, that the subject
remain on probation to the court and payment be made through the court.
A civil judgment notice has been attached to this report.
R. 65. This recommendation was consistent with the parties original agreement. R. 34.
The parties' State of Defendant read, in pertinent part, Restitution/Fine related to terms of
probation = $50,000 [double underlined] - balance to become civil matter via restitution
order." R. 34. (emphasis added).

9

This testimony is contrary to the statements contained in AP&P's report requesting
early termination of probation. R. 64-65; cf. R. 82-83 (AP&P's second progress/violation
report filed alleging a violation contrary to previous request for early termination - this was
ordered by the judge based upon his September 30, 2002 intentions.
11

C-

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.
After a series of hearings, mostly probation reviews, and after one change of judge,

the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on November 22, 2005, nearly two months
after the defendant's original date her probation was to expire - September 30, 2005. At
that hearing, the court considered the evidence before it and based on the court's stated
intentions during the sentencing hearing "Restitution is to be paid to Adult Probation and
Parole — and I placed here — a rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole with the
Court's intent that it be paid as recommended by Adult Probation within one year," T. 8,
extended Gambill's probation another 36 months. In the Court's PSI, the prosecutor at
the time of sentencing, William McGuire, stated that the Restitution in this case is
$300,000. He admitted to the PSI investigator that the event had taken place "5 years ago
and an order of restitution needs to be entered." R. 175.10 (sealed documents)

D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In this matter, the Defendant received $300,000 from Edison Harris. R. 33. The

defendant Mrs. Gambill was not a licensed financial broker. R. 33. The money she
retrieved was for investment purposes. Mr. Harris, who provided Ms. Gambill $300,000
reported:

10

It needs to be noted that the court seal was already broken before defense counsel's
retrieval of the record for purposes of briefing.
12

Mrs. Gambill took our money with the promise of paying us back a substantial
increase, and return of out money ($300,000) a return of a ($90,000) profit, within
ten days.
When this didn't materialize, we contacted her, many many (sic) times. She
promised to wire our money, and also interest on our money, (sic) She has never
lined up to her commitment, or promise.
Because of the actions of Jackie Gambill, most of our Retirement is gone . . . .
R. 175 (Victim Impact Statement - sealed document).
In particularly, Mr. Harris issued Mrs. Gambill a check on May 27, 1997. R. 175
(sealed attachment to impact statement). This being the situation, in that Mrs. Gambill
resided in Arizona and Mr. Harris being a Utah resident, and having only receiving a
check for $28,000 in 1999,11 Mr. Harris sought criminal charges because she was not
living up to her promises. See Impact Statement. (Broken promises are not crimes). On
January 2, 2002, the Davis County Attorney's Office filed charges against Mrs. Gambill.
R. 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
First, in this matter, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings,
the evidence is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking
defendant's probation. State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). Clearly,
according to the court's intentions stated in the September 30, 2002 hearing, T. 8, Mrs.
Gambill did not pay her restitution as desired. However, both of the parties, the State's
11

According to the PSI report. R. 175 (sealed document, page 2).
13

prosecutors and AP&P staff all agreed that Mrs. Gambill was not and did not violate the
Court's written order. As a matter of fact, the Court's own written Sentence, Judgment
and Commitment can be said to violate that Court's stated intentions. The record reflects
that on October 3, 2002, Judge Dawson who uttered his intentions two days earlier,
signed and entered a written order, which failed to mention the court's intention too. R.
43. The written order is absolutely silent as to "payment within one year."
However, it is to be said, subject to the Defendant's accompanying motion to
correct record, that there appears to be a nefarious entry. On or about October 21, 2005, a
false, unsigned Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was placed into the record. R. 123.
This false record precedes Judge Dawson's recusal. But in the light most favorable to
Judge Dawson, the reflection of the "September 30, 2002 date" is a clerical error, not
intending to deceive Judge Page but was intending to reflect his review of the Sentencing
Hearing tape.
Secondly, it would appear that the district court never should have accepted
jurisdiction on this matter because it was want of jurisdiction but for the running of the
statute of limitations for felony offenses. According to Utah law, the plain language of
the information demonstrates that the charge was filed more than 4 years after the alleged
offense was said to occur, "on or about May, 1997." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1) (a)
(Supp. 2003) limits prosecutions for felonies excepted otherwise to four years stating "a
felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed."

14

Id. Mr. Harris' own words indicate that he expected a $90,000 profit to begin within ten
days of providing Mrs. Gambill his check for $300,000. R. 175 (victim impact statement
and copy of check). A judge has a duty to be vigilant concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction and on its own may challenge jurisdiction.

ARGUMENTS.
POINT ONE. THE DETERMINATION OF CONTEMPT FOR AN ALLEGED
PROBATION VIOLATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE - THE
COURT'S WRITTEN ORDER OF OCTOBER 3, 2002 DID NOT REQUIRE
PAYMENT OF RESTITUTION "WITHIN ONE YEAR."
In this matter, the defendant Jackie Sue Gambill challenges the district court's
ruling, R. 137, and Judge Rodney S. Page's final order revoking and reinstating her
probation entered March 27, 2006. R. 162. Those decisions resulted from an evidentiary
hearing held on November 22, 2005, T. 59, and the court's subsequent hearing of
February 21, 2006. T. 119. These decisions viewed in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings, the evidence is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in
revoking defendant's probation. See State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990).
According to Jameson, the challenge by Defendant can only be successful when
I
she argues the evidence in the light most favorable to Judge Page showing the court
abused it's discretion. Id. In this matter, Jackie cannot dispute that she followed the
Judge's recommendation that restitution be paid "within one year." Also, she cannot
argue that she met the court's expections, because he "intended" the restitution be paid
15

"within one year." The record is clear from the review of the tape and from a reading of
the transcript made from the taped proceeding. T. 6-8. When former judge, Judge
Dawson imposed his sentence and stayed prison in order to place Defendant on probation
and pay restitution instead, the Court made it clear he intended Mrs. Gambill to repay Mr.
Harris his $300,000 within one year. T. 8. In the hearing, Judge Dawson stated, inter
alia:
Restitution is to be paid to Adult Probation and Parole — and I placed here — a
rate determined by Adult Probation and Parole with the Court's intent that it be
paid as recommended by Adult Probation within one year." T. 8.
T. 8. There is very little room to wiggle concerning this fact in light of Jameson.
However, when viewed in light of other case law and the clear weight of the other
evidence before the court including the admissions of all those involved, including
prosecutors and AP&P agents and record, the district court did abuse its discretion. The
decision to violate Mrs. Gambill and revoke and reinstate her probation was upon the
single piece of evidence, that being the district court's intentions stated in court before
publishing his written order on October 3, 2002. Even though all of the parties otherwise
have agreed with Mrs. Gambill that she was "compliant" with the terms of her sentence,
the departure started with the district court's own written order he entered less than three
days following. On October 3, 2002, the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment is
absolutely silent as to a time limitation for repaying monies to Mr. Harris. R. 43. The
order for payment of restitution merely states, "Restitution is to be paid at a rate AP&P

16

determines." R. 45. (Addendum D). The parties' Plea Agreement intended Mrs.
Gambill to only pay $50,000 before the remainder would convert to a civil judgment. R.
34. (Addendum E). Adult Probation and Parole, on April 25, 2005, filed a progress
report with the court seeking Mrs. Gambill's early termination. R. 64, 152; T. 73. The
report was praising Mrs. Gambill. Even after the Court reviewed the situation and
requested AP&P to file an Order to Show Cause on July 5, 2005, T. 19, the State, through
the prosecutor Michael Direda, on August 9, 2005, T. 25, moved to dismiss the OSC
because he felt the State "lacked the confidence" to prevail, T. 24-25, because the
documents failed to coincide with the court's intentions. T. 24. Apparently, the State
knew the written order of the court failed to impose a time limitation. Id.
Despite the court's findings, the district court's determination failed to follow
Court of Appeals guidance. In Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App.
1996) this Court addressed circumstances similar dealing with recommendations of the
commissioner, who addressed the defendant at the time the matter was to be rescheduled.
In the subsequent hearing, the defendant did not appear even though requested by the
Commissioner to be present. The commissioner wanted to hold that defendant in
contempt.
This Court held, "For the court to hold one in contempt of an order, that order must
be clearly understood to be an order. To be enforced, an order must be sufficiently
specific and definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning." Id,
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at 455. (Citing International Longshoremen's Ass'n. Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n. 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S. Ct. 201, 208, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967)). Then this
Court clarified, "Moreover, the order need not be in writing, but it must be objectively
understandable as an order from which sanctions may accrue for disobedience." Id. This
Court stated that "Such was not the case here. Therefore, the State could not be
sanctioned for disobeying the Commissioner's request."
Here, Mrs. Gambill is similarly situated. Make no mistake, a finding of a violation
of probation or failure to pay restitution is contempt. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (b)
(1953, as amended) proscribes, inter alia:
Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to
pay should not be treated as contempt of court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (iii) (Supp. 2005).
The "within one year" language made in the September 30, 2002 hearing, T. 8., as
used by Judge Dawson included such words as "intent" and "recommend." The
subsequent written order following, a mere three days later, on October 3, 2003, R. 43,
ordered only "Restitution is to be paid at a rate AP&P determines." R. 45. Mrs. Gambill
cannot be said to have understood differently than what was ordered. Judge Dawson's
earlier statements of intentions or recommendations were not binding at the time when
Mrs. Gambill and AP&P set their payment arrangements. (Addenda F & G). Here,
AP&P set up $500 a month payments and Mrs. Gambill faithfully and consistently paid
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that sum. T. 73. Her full compliance prompted the April 25, 2005 request by AP&P for
early termination. R. 64-65, 152-53. (Addendum H).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1953, as amended) sets forth the only circumstance
where probation may be extended. It reads, in pertinent part:
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding
that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (a) & (b) (Supp. 2005).
In summation, even though the district court's Judge Dawson made his intentions
clear to Mrs. Gambill during the September 30, 2002 hearing, his actual order on October
3, 2002 was less oppressive. It's only that order coupled with everyone's understanding,
not just Mrs. Gambill's understanding alone, which should lead to this Court's
conclusion that Judge Page did abuse his discretion when he considered the issue of
whether Mrs. Gambill violated her probation because the clear weight of the court's order
and the input of all those she was required to listen to which caused her to believe she
was complying with the district court's order. Therefore, no violation of the terms or her
probation pursuant Section 77-18-1 is possible and no contempt was ever apparent. The
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judgment of the district court should be set aside.

POINT TWO.
THE STATE OF UTAH LACKED ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. NO
COMMENCEMENT OF A CRIMINAL ACTION EVER SHOULD HAVE
COMMENCED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. THE COURT, PLAINLY,
FAILED ITS DUTY TO REALIZE IT LACKED SUBJECT-MATTER
JURISDICTION.
In this matter, Mrs. Gambill also raises the issue of jurisdiction first time on
appeal. She challenges the trial court's original jurisdiction because of the running of the
felony statute of limitations. The determination of which limitations period applies to a
third degree felony is a statutory interpretation, and a court's interpretation of a statute is
a legal conclusion. State v. McGee. 31 P. 3d 531 (Utah 2001); State v. Burns. 4 P.3d 795
(Utah 2000); see also Quick Safe-T Hitch. Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C.. 12 P.3d 577 (Utah
2000). Furthermore, whether the statute of limitations has run is a legal conclusion. See
Estes v. Tibbs. 979 P.2d 823 (Utah 1999) ("The trial court's application of a statute of
limitations presents a question of law [that] we review for correctness." {citing Julian v.
State. 966 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998))). For legal conclusions no deference would be
given to the trial court any how.
Nevertheless, the issue is properly raised here because Mrs. Gambill invokes the
plain error exception. Because the issue is being raised for the first time, while on appeal,
this Court must review the issue under a plain error standard. See State v. Ellifritz. 835
P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1)
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an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3)
the error is harmful. See State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). In this matter,
all three elements exist.

A,

Error Indeed Occurred.
In this matter, an error did in fact occur. The State's criminal information and Mr.

Harris, the alleged victim, both admit that the alleged offense occurred in May, 1997.
Specifically, Mr. Hariris' check was tendered to Mrs. Gambill on May 27, 1997. R. 175
(sealed documents, see victim impact statement and copy of check). Even the prosecutor,
William McGuire, admitted to the PSI investigator, that the alleged offense had occurred
more than five years earlier. R. 175. The charges of Sale of Unlicensed Security (61-17), a third degree felony, and Sale of Security by Unlicensed Broker-Dealer (61-1-3), a
third degree felony, R. 4-5, were undisputedly filed on January 2, 2002. R. 1. The time
span between May 27, 1997 to January 2, 2002 is a total of four years and six months and
seven days. The statute of limitations had ran six months and seven days before criminal
proceedings even commenced. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1) (a) (Supp. 2003) limits
prosecutions for felonies excepted otherwise to four years stating "a felony or negligent
homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed." Id. In this matter,
the offense was allegedly committed on May 27, 1997 and when $90,000 profits were not
received within 10 days, a reasonable person was placed on notice on or about June 6,
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1997 that an offense may have been committed. There is no justification for an alleged
delay of this kind.

B.

The Error was Obvious to the Court.
The running of the statute of limitations is obvious, and should have been obvious

to the district court. The information itself contained all the necessary ingredients to
make that determination of an actual error. It has historically been the duty of the court to
watch for violations of the statute of limitations, in that they are due process violations.
See Department of Social Srvs. v. Viiil 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).
The judge has a duty to continually inspect the record of the case, and if subject-matter
jurisdiction does not appear at any time from the record of the case, then he has the duty
to dismiss the case as lacking subject-matter jurisdiction. Should a judge act in any case
in which he does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, he is acting unlawfully, U.S. v.
Will 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821), and without any judicial
authority.

C.

The Error Was Harmful.
In this matter, the final element Mrs. Gambill must demonstrate is that she was

harmed. The Defendant claims she was harms constitutionally in that he due process was
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violated. Department of Social Srvs. v. Viiil 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) offers
guidance here.
The Utah Supreme Court in Vijil held that when a motion to vacate a judgment is
based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction
is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against
whom it runs. Id, (citing In re Marriage of Stroud. 631 P.2d 168, 170 n.5 (Colo. 1981);
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973). Given the duty
of the court and in light of the Defendant's constitutional injury, the district court never
should have allowed the proceeding to maintain. The matter should have been dismissed.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon constitutional violations of due process for the running of the statute
of limitation period for felonies proscribed by Section 76-1-302, the State's prosecution
of Mrs. Gambill, an Arizona resident, never should have commenced - it was nearly five
years old at the time of it's filing by the Davis County Attorney.
Based upon the district court violation of Section 77-18-1, this Court should vacate
the defendant Jackie Sue Gambill's continued probation. The district court abused its
discretion to find that Gambill violated the terms of her probation when she complied
with the written order of October 3, 2002 and the instructions of those supervising her
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probation. The clear evidence before the court was that she did not violate the terms of
her probation only that everyone, including the judge when he wrote the October 3, 2002
written order is that no one followed the court's in-court requests. It cannot be disputed
that he made his intentions known and that he did state his recommendation to have Mrs.
Gambill repay Mr. Harris "within one year." T. 8. Under the circumstances, in light of
Dorman-Ligh. those comments from the judge can only be viewed as a request and not as
a binding order.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of
January, 2007.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Appellant - Defendant
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GENERAL, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 841140854.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SECOND
COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT DISTRTCT
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State of Utah
Plaintiff,
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RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND AFFIDAVIT IN VIOLATION
Case No. 021700002

v.
*
H

Jackie Sue Gambill
Defendant
Judge: Rodney S. Page
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above entitled Court on
November 22, 2005. The State was present represented by Mr. Brandon Poll. The
defendant was present and represented by Mr. D. Bruce Oliver. The Court having
reviewed the arguments of counsel, the evidence that was presented at that time, and
the video taped hearing of the sentencing which occurred on September 30, 2002, and
the subsequent hearing on the Order to Show Cause which was heard on August 9,
2005, and having reviewed the file in this matter, and being fully advised in the
premises, rules as follows:
The defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Glen R. Dawson on September
30, 2002 to zero-to-five years in the State Prison, and a fine of $5,000 plus surcharge
on each of the two counts. The Court then suspended the prison sentence and placed
the defendant on probation to Adult Probation and Parole for 36 months. Among other
things, her probation was conditioned upon her serving 60 days in jail and paying
$300,000 restitution to the victims.
The Court pronounced the sentence in open court. Defendant was present with
her attorney and the Court specifically provided that restitution was to be paid within
one year. The Court stated that the payment was to be set by Adult Probation and
Parole so that in fact, it could be paid within one year.
i Violal
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The Court asked defendant and counsel if they had any questions. Counsel for
»
w

*

i

the defendant questioned only the jail sentence and made a request for home
confinement, which was denied by the Court.
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w

Later on October 10, 2002, the offender signed an Offender Instruction Form

$

^

which provided for restitution in the amount of $301,104 payable at the rate of $8,364
per month (which would result in the complete payment over the 36 month term of
probation). On that same date, she also signed a Probation Agreement which, among
other things, provided for payment of restitution in the amount of $300,000 at the rate to
be determined by Adult Probation and Parole.
The defendant was never able to make the $8,300 payment per month, neither
has she paid the full amount of the restitution.
She was subsequently compacted to Arizona and at some point probation in
Arizona agreed that payment would be reduced to $500 per month. The defendant has
made the $500 per month payments as agreed with probation and complied with other
terms of probation; however, she still owes over $200,000 on restitution.
An affidavit of violation was filed by Adult Probation and Parole on July 20, 2005
alleging that defendant had violated her Probation agreement by having failed to pay
the complete restitution. That affidavit was subsequently amended by an affidavit
which was filed on August 2, 2005 alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with
the terms of probation as ordered by the Judge in failing to pay the restitution as
ordered.
The matter came on for hearing on August 9, 2005. Adult Probation and Parole
requested that probation be terminated and that restitution be converted to a civil
2

judgment for collection. The State opposed that recommendation and counsel agreed
•*

that the matter be continued to September 13, 2005 for further hearing before Judge

0

Dawson on the question of violation of probation and the issue of termination of

5J

probation.
Prior to the hearing on September 13th, Judge Dawson recused himself and the

H

matter was reassigned to this Court for determination by order entered on November 2,
2005.
The matter came before the Court for hearing on November 9, 2005, as stated
above.
The Court finds that defendant was placed on probation by the Honorable Glen
R. Dawson on September 30, 2002. As part of that sentence, defendant was ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $300,000. Neither the defendant nor her counsel
objected to that condition of probation as ordered by the Court in open court on that
date. Further the defendant acknowledged the $300,000 both in the Offender
Instruction Form and the Probation Agreement that she signed on October 10, 2002.
Although there has been some confusion as to the rate at which the restitution
was to be paid, there has never been any confusion in the sentence imposed by the
Court nor in the documents of Adult Probation and Parole, that the restitution amount
was $300,000.
The Court finds that defendant is bound by the order of the Court and her
probation agreement to pay $300,000 in restitution.
The Court would find that she has failed to pay the restitution as ordered by the
Court, but that her failure to pay does not amount to a violation of her probation such as
3

would justify the Court in revoking her probation at this time. However, in light of the
»

extensive amount of restitution yet to be paid, the Court will extend the formal probation

*

of the defendant to Adult Probation and Parole for the purposes of collecting restitution,

p

That restitution is to be paid on such terms and conditions as shall be set by the Court

H
V

at a subsequent hearing. Until that time, defendant is ordered to continue to maker her
present payment to Adult Probation and Parole.
The Court extends probation pursuant to its authority under Section 77-18-1 et.
seq. and pursuant to case law as set forth in State of Utah vs. Noyes, 2000 UT App
211; and State vs. Dickey, 841 P 2nd 1203 (1992).
This Court further finds that the filing of the affidavits and orders to show cause
by Adult Probation and Parole on July 20, 2005 and August 2, 2005, tolled the running
of any probationary period.
This decision does not consider nor rule on any claimed irregularities in
defendant's plea of guilty.
Counsel are directed to set the matter for further hearing on the question of
payment at a time that is convenient for the Court and counsel. Counsel for the State is
to take the lead in setting that hearing.
Dated this

9 ^

day of January, AD 2006
BY THE COURT:

Rodney S J P a ^ o /
District Court Jjd^e

S ^ ^
Or
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I hereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ruling tor
Brandon Poll
Deputy Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and
Adult Probation and Parole
883 West Clark Lane
Farmington, Utah 84025
postage prepaid this

*f-£- day of January, AD 2006.
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Clerk of Court
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Addendum B
March 27, 2006 Order Revoking Probation
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
REVIEW HEARING
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 021700002 FS

JACKIE SUE GAMBILL,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

RODNEY S PAGE
February 21, 2 006

PRESENT
Clerk:
tacyb
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 2, 1945
Video
Tape Number:
2/21/06
Tape Count: 3:59
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TAPE: 2/21/06
COUNT: 3:59
This is the time set for review of probation and to set
restitution payments.
The Court previously ruled that it has jurisdiction in this matter
and continued defendant's probation and terms,
Mr. Oliver has filed an appeal to that ruling, as is his right
The Court will proceed with this matter and set terms of
probation.
The Court recounts history of the case. It was Judge Dawson's
that defendant pay the full amount of restitution, $300,000, within
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Case No: 021700002
Date:
Feb 21, 2006
one year. Defendant was compacted to Arizona and has been making
$500-per-month payments.
Mr. Poll requests an increase in payments.
Mr. Oliver states that all the payments defendant has made have
not been credited toward the total restitution owed. She made
payments of $28,000 and $42,000 prior to sentencing.
He states that it was defendant's understanding that if she paid
$5 0,00 0, the balance would be converted to a civil judgment. To
that end, she made a payment of $25,0 00.
In the meantime, she was incarcerated and could not pay the other
$25,000. At that time her husband filed for divorce (which was
later dismissed) and her business partner absconded with all the
business funds.
After defendant's release, she began paying $500 per month as
agreed by her probation officer in Arizona. She was trying to pay
the other $25,000, so that the balance can be converted to a civil
judgment. Those payments total $18,000.
The Court requests testimony from defendant regarding her assets
and income.
Defendant, Jackie Sue Gambill, is sworn and testifies.
Defendant corrects Mr. Oliver's representation that the monthly
payments she made in Arizona totaled $18,000, stating that
additional payments were made bringing the amount to $25,000.
Defendant has a Honda purchased for her by her son, as well as a
Jeep purchased for her by her husband. Her husband drives a Honda.
The Court questions defendant regarding the income and assets of
her husband.
Defendant states that she has been married for fourteen years.
The marital home is in a trust. Defendant states she receives very
little information regarding her husbands assets or income.
Defendant's husband's income includes social security, military
retirement (from which she will receive no survivor benefit) and
$100,000 per year earnings from Honeywell.
Defendant is informed that as of sentencing, the amount owed is a
c ivi1 j udgment.
Victim, Edison Harris, makes statements to the Court.
Probation is revoked and restarted as of the date of the Court's
ruling in the matter, January 9, 2006.
The Court orders that Mr. Poll is to determine what has been paid
and the remaining balance owing. If further hearing is needed to
make a determination, the matter can be put back on the calendar.
The Court orders that judgment enter with interest to accrue at
the legal rate at the time of sentencing.
Page 2

Case No: 021700002
Date:
Feb 21, 2006
Mr. Harris is informed that he can collect on this judgment
through a civil attorney in Arizona.
The Court states that there is no provision to find that defendant
violated probation, unless it is determined that she had resources
to pay the restitution in full and did not.
The Court will review this matter every six months. A review is
set 8/22/06 at 3:30 p.m. Defendant need not be present unless so
ordered, but counsel are to be here.
Mr. Oliver,requests that defendant be taken off formal probation,
so that the $100 supervisory fee she is paying to the State of
Arizona can be applied toward restitution.
The Court may consider that in the future, but denies it at this
time.
Defendant is to go with Probation Officer Mr. Hamberlin to sign
another probation application to Arizona.
The defendant's probation is revoked.
The defendant's probation is reinstated.
Previous terms and conditions of probation apply.
Defendant is to pay restitution at $700 per month.
Defendant is to continue probation in Arizona.
REVIEW OR PROBATION/PMTS is scheduled.
Date 08/22/2006
Time 03:30 p.m.
Location Courtroom 6
Justice Complex
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84 025
Before Judge RODNEY S PAGE
Dated t h i s
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In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Ali Holmes at
801-447-3818 at least three working days prior to the proceeding.
The general information phone number is 801-44 7-3800.
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Addendum C
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions

§ 76-1-301

CRIMINAL CODE
Library References

Criminal Law ®=>147.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 11 Okl47.
Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
Wharton's Criminal Law § 92, Statute of
2 Criminal Law Defenses § 202, Statute of
Limitations.
Limitations.

§ 7 6 - 1 - 3 0 1 . 5 . Time limitations for prosecution of misusing public monies,
falsification or alteration of government records, and bribery
(1) A prosecution for misusing public monies, falsification or alteration of
government records, or for a bribery offense shall be commenced within two
years after facts constituting the offense have been reported to a prosecutor
having responsibility and jurisdiction to prosecute the offense.
(2) This section does not shorten the limitation of actions under Section
76-1-302 or Subsection 76-1-303(3).
Laws 1995, c. 232, § 2, eft May 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 155, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws
2002, c. 208, § 2, eff. May 6, 2002.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2002, c. 208, inserted in subsec. (2)
"Section 76-1-302 or".
Library References
Criminal Law <s=>147.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 11 Okl 47.

§ 7 6 — 1 - 3 0 2 . Time limitations for prosecution of offenses—Provisions if
DNA evidence would identify the defendant—Commencement of prosecution
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years
after it is committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced
within two years after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is committed.
(2)(a) A
prosecution
for
the
offenses
listed
in
Subsections
76-3-203.5(l)(c)(i)(A) through (P) may be commenced at any time if the identity
of the person who committed the crime is unknown but DNA evidence is
collected that would identify the person at a later date.
(b) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply if the statute of limitations on a crime
has run as of May 5, 2003, and no charges have been filed.
(3) If the statute of limitations would have run but for the provisions of
Subsection (2) and identification of a perpetrator is made through DNA, a
16

§ 76-1-302

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Note 3

prosecution shall be commenced within one year of the discovery of the identity
of the perpetrator.
(4) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictment
by a grand jury or upon the filing of a complaint or information.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-302; Laws 1985, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 2, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 5,
§ 1; Laws 2003, c. 61, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2003, c. 61, inserted new subsecs. (2)
and (3).
Cross References
Securities, limitation of prosecutions, see § 61-1-21.1.
Library References
Criminal Law <3=>147, 148.1, 154, 157.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110kl47;
110kl48.1; 110kl54; 110kl57.

C J . S . Criminal Law §§ 199 to 202, 206.

Research References
Treatises and Practice Aids
1 Criminal Procedure, Second
§ 1.7(D), Ordinance Violations.

Wharton's Criminal Law § 92, Statute of
Limitations.

Edition

Notes of Decisions
2.

Tolling of limitations period
Aggravated robbery prosecution was not
barred by four-year statute of limitations, although robbery occurred in September 1976
and defendant was not tried until June 1985,
given statute providing that period of limitation
does not run against defendant during time he
is out of state following commission of offense.
U.C.A.1953, 76-l~302(l)(a), 76-1-304. State v.
Wright, 1987, 745 P.2d 447, denial of habeas
corpus affirmed 986 F.2d 1432, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 108, 510 U.S. 834, 126 L.Ed.2d
74, dismissal of habeas corpus affirmed 886
P.2d 58. Criminal Law ©=» 152
Filing of an information commences action
and thus tolls running oi applicable statute of
limitations.
U.C.A.1953,
76-1-302(2),
77-35-5(a, b). State v. Strand, 1983, 674 P.2d
109. Criminal Law <3=> 157
August 1981 information charging defendant
with making false material statements under
oath, although later dismissed because it lacked
signature of prosecuting attorney, served to toll
statute of limitations, which did not resume
running until February 24, 1982, the date information
was
dismissed.
U.C.A.1953,
76-l-302(l)(a), 76-8-502(1). State v. Strand,
1983, 674 P.2d 109. Criminal Law <3=> 160

Fraud 3
Prearrest delay 4
Retroactive application 1
Tolling of limitations period
Waiver by guilty plea 5
1. Retroactive application
1996 amendment to limitations statute, which
added aggravated sexual abuse of a child to the
list of crimes specifically covered by the fouryears-after-report statute of limitations, did not
apply retroactively to allow the state to charge
defendant with alleged sexual abuse that occurred in 1983 and 1984, as the applicable fouryear catchall limitations statute expired before
the amendment became effective. U.C.A. 1953,
76-1^-303.5,
76-5-404.1(3);
U.C.A.
1953,
76-l-302(l)(a) (1978). State v. Lusk, 2001, 37
P 3 d 1103, 436 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 2001 UT 102.
Criminal Law <®=> 146
Legislature, in amending statute of limitations
could have extended amended statute to crimes
committed prior to the amendment, without
running afoul of the ex post facto prohibition in
the State and Federal Constitutions. U.C.A.
!953,
68-3-3,
76-l-302(l)(a),
76-1-303,
76-U303(c),
76-l-307(c),
76-5-402.1,
76-5^402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1.
State v. Lavoto, 1989, 776 P.2d 912. Constitutional Law <£=> 197; Criminal Law <$=> 146

3.

Fraud
Statute extending limitations period for prosecuting offenses involving fraud for one year
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PUNISHMENTS
appeal did not preclude Supreme Court from
requinng that defendant be lawfully sentenced,
where trial court had unquestionably erred by
overlookmg minimum mandatory sentencing
provisions applicable to offenses of which defendant had been convicted, and State could not
properly have appealed the issue U C A 1 9 5 3 ,
76-3-201(5), 76-5-302, 76-5-405, 77-35-26(c)
State v Babbell, 1989, 770 P 2d 987 Criminal
Law <©=> 1136
Trial court did not abuse its discretion m
sentencing defendant to presumptive ten-year
term of middle seventy, rather than lower fiveyear term, for conviction of kidnapping of child,
but trial court's refusal to state reasons for its

§ 76-3—201.1.

choice of sentence as required by statute required
resentencing
U C A 1953,
76-3-20 l(6)(b), 76-5-301 1(4) State v Shickl e s , 1988, 760 P 2d 291 Sentencing And Punl s hment to 2251, Kidnapping <&» 41, SentencAnd
Plmishment ^
373
Tnal

COurt has
discretion m sentencing and
y o r d e r sentences to run consecutively, and
Supreme Court will not disturb sentence unless
lt
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless trial
court
abused its discretion
UCA1953,
76-3-201, 76-3-401
State v * Shelby, 1986,
728 P 2d 987 Criminal Law <§=» 1147, Sentencmg And Punishment <3=» 548

ma

Collection of criminal judgment accounts receivable

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Criminal judgment accounts receivable" means any amount due the
state arising from a criminal judgment for which payment has not been
received by the state agency that is servicing the debt.
(b) "Accounts receivable" includes unpaid fees, overpayments, fines, forfeitures, surcharges, costs, interest, penalties, restitution to victims, third party
claims, claims, reimbursement of a reward, and damages.
(2)(a) A criminal judgment account receivable ordered by the court as a
result of prosecution for a criminal offense may be collected by any means
authorized by law for the collection of a civil judgment.
(b)(i) The court may permit a defendant to pay a criminal judgment
account receivable in installments.
(ii) In the district court, if the criminal judgment account receivable is
paid in installments, the total amount due shall include all fines, surcharges, postjudgment interest, and fees.
(c) Upon default in the payment of a criminal judgment account receivable
or upon default in the payment of any installment of that receivable, the
criminal judgment account receivable may be collected as provided in this
section or Subsection 77-18-1(9) or (10), and by any means authorized by
law for the collection of a civil judgment.
(3) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a criminal judgment
account receivable or any installment of that receivable, the court, on motion of
the prosecution, victim, or upon its own motion may:
(a) order the defendant to appear and show cause why the default should
not be treated as contempt of court; or
(b) issue a warrant of arrest.
(4)(a) Unless the defendant shows that the default was not attributable to an
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure to make a good
feith effort to make the payment, the court may find that the default constitutes
contempt.
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(b) Upon a finding of contempt, the court may order the defendant committed until the criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified part of
it, is paid.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default is not
contempt, the court may enter an order for any of the following or any
combination of the following:
(a) require the defendant to pay the criminal judgment account receivable
or a specified part of it by a date certain;
(b) restructure the payment schedule;
(c) restructure the installment amount;
(d) except as provided in Section 77-18-8, execute the original sentence of
imprisonment;
(e) start the period of probation anew;
(f) except as limited by Subsection (6), convert the criminal judgment
account receivable or any part of it to community service;
(g) except as limited by Subsection (6), reduce or revoke the unpaid
amount of the criminal judgment account receivable; or
(h) in the district court, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility
for collecting the judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(6) In issuing an order under this section, the court may not modify the
amount of the judgment of complete restitution.
(7) Whether or not a default constitutes contempt, the court may add to the
amount owed the fees established under Subsection 63A-8-201(4)(g) and postjudgment interest.
(8)(a)(i) If a criminal judgment account receivable is past due in a case
supervised by the Department of Corrections, the judge shall determine whether or not to record the unpaid balance of the account receivable as a civil
judgment.
(ii) If the judge records the unpaid balance of the account receivable as a
civil judgment, the judge shall transfer the responsibility for collecting the
judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(b) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by
the Department of Corrections is past due, the district court may, without a
motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the criminal judgment
account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the responsibility for
collecting the account receivable to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(c) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by
the Department of Corrections is more than 90 days past due, the district
court shall, without a motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the
criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the
responsibility for collecting the criminal judgment account receivable to the
Office of State Debt Collection.
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Repealed

<{9)(a) When a fine, forfeiture, surcharge, cost permitted by statute, fee, or an
)rder of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association,
he person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation
)r association shall pay the obligation from those assets.
(b) Failure to pay the obligation may be held to be contempt under
Subsection (3).
(10) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in behalf of a victim.
_aws 1979, c 69, § 2, Laws 1983, c. 262, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 2, Laws 1999, c.
>79, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 135, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002, Laws 2003, c. 278,
? 1, eff May 5, 2003
Historical and Statutory Notes
t a w s 2002, c 135, modified a statute refer'nee in subsec (7)

Laws 2003, c 278, inserted m subsec (l)(b)
"reimbursement of a reward"

Cross References
Contempt, see § 78-32-1 et seq
3mce of state debt collection created, see § 63A-8-201
Library References
Contempt <3=25
Costs @=>320
Sentencing and Punishment <S»2213 to 2217
Westlaw Key Number Searches
93k25,
102k320, 350Hk2213to350Hk2217

C J S Contempt § 14
C J S Criminal Law §§ 1771 to 1786

N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
tn general

1

L In general
Under former statutes, trial court which had
accepted recommendation by Department of
*<iult Probation and Parole (AP&P) that it su-rvise balance of probationary term imposed
igainst defendant, who had fulfilled all condiions of probation except payment of restitution,
*nd had declined to extend probationary period,
etained continuing jurisdiction to enforce restiution order after probationary period had exDlr
ed
u C A 1953, 76-3-201,
U C A 1953,
7
^ 3 - 2 0 l 1 (1983) State v Nones, 2000, 11
3d 709, 399 Utah Adv Rep 14, 2000 UT App
ll l Sentencing And Punishment <3=> 1948

§ 76-3-201.2.

Court had jurisdiction to recall defendant and
hold him or her accountable for full payment of
restitution or fines according to sentencing order to which defendant had previously agreed
U C A 1953, 76-3-201 1(1), 77-18-1(13)
State
v Dickey, 1992, 841 P 2d 1203, certiorari denied 853 P 2d 897
Sentencing And Pumshment <&=> 2213, Fines <&=> 2
Trial court properly exercised jurisdiction to
enforce restitution order after period of defendant's probation expired, where action was
within eight years from entry of judgment ordenng payment of restitution
U C A 1953,
76-3-201,
76-3-201 (3)(a),
76-3-201 1(5),
77-18-1(13), 77-18-6, 78-22-1 State v Dickey, 1992, 841 P 2d 1203, certiorari denied 853
P 2d 897 Sentencing And Punishment <S=> 2215

Repealed by Laws 2002, c. 35, § 15, eff. May 6, 2002
Historical and Statutory Notes

" e repealed section related to civil actions by
/lc
tims for damages

§ 76-3-201.3.

Repealed by Laws 1996, c. 40, § 15, eff. April 29, 1996
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(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance wiilff
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervise
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordar
with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felonf
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemi
ors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period xi
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the ac<|
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jt
tion of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation^
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable,,
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall records
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorde
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the 4)|
State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the deferi|
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as conte
court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office*
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advan§|
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report *a|
plete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confineine
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing|
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total P r °b3j|
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke t h ^ J
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing.^
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute ser
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rard the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the

glring.
flhe running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
ttion report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi| of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant
ie court.
Z)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
iig by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
Utioner has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
landing that the conditions of probation have been violated.
|(B)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts assert^to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
luthorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
ause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
fstified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
fearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
Rearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for
him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
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Addendum D
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment

2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021700002 FS

JACKIE SUE GAMBILL,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

GLEN R. DAWSON
September 30, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
lanas
Prosecutor: MCCUIRE, WILLIAM K
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, GEOFFREY
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 2, 1945
Video
Tape Number:
9-3 0-02
Tape Count: 3:05
CHARGES
2. UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/19/2002 Guilty
3. SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/19/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Page 1

Case No: 021700002
Date:
Sep 30, 2002

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of
60 day(s) in the Davis County Jail.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 60 day(s) in the Davis County Jail.
Commitment is to begin immediately.

SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE
No work release is granted.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine: $9250.00
Suspended: $9250.00

Charge # 3

Fine: $9250.00
Suspended: $9250.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$18500.00
$18500.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $300000.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: EDISON HARRIS

Page 2

Case No: 021700002
Date:
Sep 30, 2002

SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Restitution is to be paid at a rate AP&P determines.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 12 0 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement.
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee.
No involvement in Security Sales.

_£>

Dated this

3>

day of

Oci^

, 20 Q Q .

Page 3 (last)

Addendum E
Statement of Defendant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

^AcEi-e Gitwhl \
Dciciiuant.

, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have
been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes:

Crime & Statutory
Provision

^h li$s(rr?*^eh>

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

TZt
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$*?..* I f*)&*r)
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S£C^
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AjAlii'cC^^')]
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Sr/yt

D.
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me, and
I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are:

iFf

W

^

Ky7!
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I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed above. I stipulate
and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to
which I am pleading guilty

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the constitutions
of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an
attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the judge determined that
I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also understand my
rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is

C^-fyf^f)^

(s/tfhZjK

. My attorney and

I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that
I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, a) I would
have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived
my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to

-2-

and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not
afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I
would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one could make me
testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that
they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am presumed
innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose tofightthe charges against me, I
need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of
proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be
unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting that I
committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the
right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those
costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and
constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which I am
pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting
myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term,fine,or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that
I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on
charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, the
sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time (concurrently), I
know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation
or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty,
my guilty plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now
pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, Iknow the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.
Plea bargain. My guilty plea(s) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this
statement, including those explained below:
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel
or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to
what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful influence of any
kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement have been
made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its contents and
adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. j *n J
I am
years of age. I have attended school through the / C^J ^grade. I can read and understand
the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the
influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty.
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding these
proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would
prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea(s), I must file a written motion to withdraw my
plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to
withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason.
Dated this

»JLJJ!
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Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for ^\f)0Xi^
Cl^J^^oj 0 ) / h t n e defendant above, and that I
know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and
believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To
the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the
factua) synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No.
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
\
/)
* /
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case a g a i n s t - Q ^ ^ ^ W ^ ^ I / ,, defendant.
<
I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a
plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement;
Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court^There is reasonable i
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offe^se(s) for which 1
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTION ATTORNEY
Bar No.

7/^

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and counsel,
and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that the defendant's
guilty plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea(s) to the crime(s) set forth in the Statement
be accepted and entered.
Dated this

[ ^

day of

i4—^

, 20^Q_.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Addendum F
Probation Agreement

STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
FARMINGTON
DIST

DAVIS

Court

County

PROBATION AGREEMENT 021700002
Case#

152411
Offender #

I, JACKIE SUE GAMBILL, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be accountable for my actions and conduct to
the Department of Corrections and the Court. I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the court and set forth in this Agreement, consistent with
the laws of the state of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or any conditions thereof, or any new conviction for a crime, may result in action by
the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my probation period to commence again.
VISITS

1.

rr

Permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by agents of Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of
ensuring compliance with the conditions of the probation agreement.

REPORTINGQL/\ Not abscond from probation supervision. A-Reporting: Report as directed by the Department of Corrections. B-Residence: Establish and
reside at a residence of record and not change residence without first obtaining permission from the probation agent. C-Leaving the
State: Not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other state to which I am released or transferred without prior written permission
from the probation agent. Reporting Instructions: Report as directed by your agent.

3.

CONDUCTykZj

4.

WEAPONS^

Not possess, have under control, have in custody or on the premises where residing any explosives, firearms or dangerous weapons.
(Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the supervising agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to
individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and who have never been convicted of a felony.

CHEMIC

Abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled substances (58-37-2
U.C.A.) and submit to tests of breath or body fluids to ensure compliance with the probation agreement.

¥•

Obey all state, federal and municipal laws. If arrested, cited or questioned by a peace officer; notify the probation agent within 48 hours.

ANALYSIS
SEARCHE!

7.

ASSOCIATION:/]

Not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in criminal activity or who has been convicted of a felony without approval
from the probation ageflt.

EMPLOXMEOT:

Unless otherwise authorized by the probation agent; seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful, full-time employment (32 hours per
week minimum) as approved by the probation agent. Notify probation agent of any change in my employment within 48 hours of the
change.
Be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all dealings with Adult Probation and Parole.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search person, residence, vehicle or any other property under control without a warrant, at
any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of the probation agreement.

Agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department of Corrections under the provisions of Utah
Statute 64-13-21.
Comply jwith Utah CodeAmL.SectionsJ3 A 0-403 -406-by submitting an adequate DNA specimen, and, unless determination is made that
theperif ndjability to pay, reimburse the responsible agency $75.00 for the cost of obtaining the specimen.
Complete any other terms or conditions of probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement.
SPECIAL7 /->
kJ\
'Commit no further violations and/or crimes.
CONDITIONSr-CZ2>!
Complete DNA testing and pay the $75.00 fee.
Serve 60 days in the Davis County Jail with no work release commencing forthwith.
Pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.00 plus interest to Edison Harris through AP&P at a rate determined by AP&P.
No involvement in security sales.

I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of the conditions of this agreement, the Court may revoke my Probation or the
Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action against me, and I hereby acknowledge of a copy of this agreement.
Dated this c* U
Witness;

day of A\)

CUn/

. 20Q^.^Probationer:,

•V

y

^SdX

f

STATE'S EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT NO.
C?
CASE NO.

ff^LllfTZ&ZP'c

Addendum G
Payment Plan

tartvbvW
^O'ZXIOOOCX
Utah
Department
f
Corrections

Fll€D

OFFENDER INSTRUCTION FORM
DISTRICT COURT

Offender: (pAf*

&lU

, ^A^l^

Offender #:

/ X K ? ^ / /

Court Case Number(s))d?/ 7£&Z><£l

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS

1. As a condition of probation>'parole you are required to pay $ %. 3L**~/
beginning in

per month

W W

(month/year)
2.

You will receive a monthly bill in the mail. It will tell you the total amount owed and the amount due for the month.

3. The bill will include an envelope in which you are to mail your payment. Please include the return stub of the bill
with your payment.
4. DO NOT MAIL CASH!! Your payments should be made by personal check, money order or cashier's check made
payable to the Department of Corrections. Always write your offender number on your payment.
5.

You will be informed if you are not allowed to pay by personal check.

6. If your personal check is returned for insufficient funds, you will no longer be allowed to pay by personal check.
7.

A payment may be made without a bill by printing your name and offender number on a sheet of paper and attaching
it to your check or money order.

8. All payments must be mailed or delivered to the Offender Obligation Unit, 36 W. Fremont Ave., Salt Lake City,
^ 84101.

TT

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

STATE'S EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT NO.

le State of Utah may seize income tax refunds to pay restitution/fines/fees.
ui

3

rQ

CASE NO.

0J>nC?riX^^

DATEREC'D
IN EVIDENCE

.,
.
/1~?L<X^ rf

CLEgj^^^^^V

erest may be added to unpaid restitution.

UJ

o
<
00

J

SUPERVISION FEE APPEAL NOTIFICATION

co CO
CO

§ § you feel you cannot afford to pay the supervision fee, an appeal process is available. Contact your agent for
g ° tructions.
CM

oo

§ ave read (or had read to me) and understand the above information.

/Offender's1 Signature

/ / Date ~^o-a

ISJ-^r ,

Agent's Signature \

Date

Addendum H
Request for Termination

/\

STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
PROTECTED
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT
^

TO: 2ND DISTRICT -

*

REGARDING: GAMBILL, Jackie Sue x%>

Farmington, Davis County, Utah
ATTN: Judge Glen R. Dawson
FROM: Farmington A.P.& P.

CASE NO.: 021700002
OFFENSE: Sale Of Unregistered Security, Third
Degree Felony
Unregistered Securities Agent, Third Degree
Felony

DATE: 04/19/2005

OFFENDER*: 152411

PROBATION DATE: 09/30/2002

ADDRESS: 16150 E POWDER HORN,
FOUNTAIN HILLS AZ 85268

LEGISLATIVE DATE: 09/29/2005

EMPLOYMENT: Owner, Covered Parking,
17100 E. Shea BlvdSte 200,
Fountain Hills AZ 85268

DEFENSE ATTY: Geoffrey L. Clark
(Subject states she has
retained Bruce Oliver)

DEFbNDANT'S EXHIBITl
EXHIBIT NO.

CASENO.

<7

AZtez&JL

DATEREC'D
IN EVIDENCE

COMMENTS:

CLERK"""

On 09/30/2002, Jackie Sue GAMBILL was placed on probation with the following conditions:
1. Complete any other terms or conditions of probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation
agreement.
2. Commit no further violations and/or crimes.
3. Complete DNA testing and pay the $75.00 fee.
4. Serve 60 days in the Davis County Jail with no work release commencing forthwith.
5. Pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.00 plus interest to Edison Harris through AP&P at a rate
determined by AP&P.
6. No involvement in security sales.

The subject is residing in Arizona and supervised under Compact Agreement. No violations have been
reported.

/;:z.

RE: GAMBILL, Jackie Sue

or,

?!:

-2-

Ms. Gambill has paid $500 per month restitution since being placed on probation. Her three year
termination date is September 28,2005. The restitution of $300,000.00 remains an issue as she still
owes nearly $265,000.00. Rather than signing a waiver to appear, the subject requests a review hearing
date before the court.
It should be noted that the victim in this case, Edison Harris (telephone # 825-4443) has called AP&P
recently, expressing interest in this case, as a large amount of restitution is still owed.
The purpose of this report is to request a review hearing, allowing the subject ample time to travel from
Arizona.
The subject states she is paying $100.00 per month supervision fee to the State of Arizona, which could
also be added to the restitution payment if formal supervision were terminated. Her Arizona probation
officer states she is compliant in all aspects of supervision.
Maximum benefit of being on formal probation has been achieved. Adult Probation and Parole
recommends termination of formal supervised probation and requests remaining restitution be converted
to civil judgment or, that the subject remain on probation to the court and payment be made through the
—
—
court.
~~ ~ "
A civil judgment notice has been attached to this report.

ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT:

NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND THE COURT.

REeOMMENDATIONrlfts respectfully recommended the court schedule a probation review hearing in
order to address restitution and formal supervised probation status.

HANK HAURAND, PROBATION OFFICER
APPROVED AND ORDERED
DENIED:
/
/ .

DATE:

: (h&

^tZTJflfr

COMMENTS:
RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED:

